Consumer Fraud Whistleblowers Wanted

The Michigan Supreme Court just breathed new life into the state’s once-aggressive Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”).

From 1999 until last week (July 31, 2026), the MCPA was almost entirely toothless. Even if the MCPA prohibited a deceptive or fraudulent business practice–it outlawed many dishonest billing, advertising, and sales scams–a business holding any sort of business license typically couldn’t be sued successfully under the Act. This was because, in 1999 an activist, “business-friendly” Michigan Supreme Court interpreted a subsection of the Act to mean it did not apply to any licensed industry. Almost every business is legally required to have a state license in Michigan: health care providers, car dealers and service shops, gas stations, banks, chiropractors, lawyers, accountants, child care providers, even barbers. The act was effectively dead.

In a new decision released last week, Attorney General v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Michigan Supreme Court found that licensed businesses can be liable under the MCPA for fraudulent and deceptive practices. This was a common-sense reading of the text of the MCPA itself, which the court acknowledged had been wrongly interpreted in the 1999 decision and cases following it.

The MCPA contains broad prohibitions of deceptive trade practices:

1. Misrepresenting the identity, origin, or quality of what’s sold — false claims about source, sponsorship, certification, geographic origin, ingredients, benefits, grade, style, or passing off used goods as new; also disparaging a competitor by false statements of fact. § 903(1)(a)–(f)

2. Deceptive advertising, pricing, and inducements — advertising with no intent to sell as represented, bait advertising without a quantity disclosure, phony price-reduction claims, “free” offers with buried conditions, rebates contingent on post-closing events, and prize offers tied to sitting through a sales pitch. § 903(1)(g)–(i), (r), (w), (ff)

3. Manufactured need and high-pressure tactics — claiming a repair or replacement is necessary when it isn’t, fabricating a home defect that endangers the family, delivering unrequested goods as though they were ordered, and coercion through the timing and nature of a sales presentation. § 903(1)(j)–(l), (aa)

4. Obscuring legal rights, credit terms, and warranties — creating confusion about a party’s rights, obligations, or remedies, about credit terms, or about a salesperson’s authority to close; unconspicuous warranty disclaimers; unknowing waivers of statutory rights; and having the consumer sign acknowledgments the merchant knows to be false. § 903(1)(m)–(p), (t), (v)

5. Material omissions and false impressions — failing to disclose a material fact the consumer couldn’t reasonably discover, failing to disclose facts made material by the seller’s own affirmative representations, and any statement that leaves the consumer reasonably believing the state of affairs is other than it is. § 903(1)(s), (bb), (cc)

6. Failure to deliver what was promised — promising prompt or timely performance the merchant knows won’t happen, gross discrepancies between oral pitch and written contract, failure to provide promised benefits, and failure to promptly refund deposits or release security interests after cancellation. § 903(1)(q), (u), (y)

7. Exploiting vulnerability and grossly excessive pricing — taking advantage of a consumer’s disability, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of the agreement, and charging a price grossly in excess of market. § 903(1)(x), (z)

8. Violations of specific statutory mandates — environmental and “degradable/recyclable” marketing claims, home and telephone solicitation rules, conditioning a sale on disclosure of a Social Security number, card-receipt truncation, identity theft protection act violations, misleading tribute-band billing, and the Act’s own cross-referenced sections. § 903(1)(dd)–(ee), (gg)–(ll)

Some of these practices also violated other laws. But the MCPA came with a powerful private enforcement mechanism: unlike other laws prohibiting the same misconduct, the MCPA required the offending business to pay the attorney fees of the defrauded consumer. This was designed to incentivize lawyers to take consumer fraud cases to court, and to enable consumers to hire attorneys even when there were not huge amounts of money at issue. No one in their right mind would pay an attorney $400 per hour to sue a company over a $900 overcharge, even if the overcharge was outright fraudulent. But if the offending business had to pay those attorney fees, that’s a game changer. The MCPA tilted the field in favor of the consumer to keep Michigan’s consumer-facing businesses honest.

For more than 25 years, the MCPA was ineffective. Unscrupulous business owners and executives knew it was ineffective, and consumers were defrauded and deceived by businesses at an alarming and increasing rate. From inscrutable and misleading medical bills to systematically denied insurance claims and everything in between, consumers were mostly out of luck when it came to holding a bad business accountable. A lawyer wouldn’t take your case unless the amount of money you lost was either six figures or more and a slam-dunk case, or you agreed to pay their hourly rate–typically hundreds of dollars per hour. Consumer lawsuits were few and far between, relying on sparse federal consumer laws that only applied to a narrow set of transactions.

That changes now. After the Eli Lilly decision restoring the MCPA prohibitions, we as consumer protection attorneys, and you as consumers and insiders, have the opportunity to make Michigan a place where honesty and fairness are expected, are the norm. A place where deceiving consumers to get their money is rare, but is punished appropriately when it occurs.

Consumer fraud and deceptive practices are often hard for the consumer to even identify. Confusing language in agreements, fast talking, misdirection and outright lies may prevent the consumer from knowing anything about how it is they’re being cheated. But they’re left with the conviction that the business they’ve dealt with cheated them and it has cost them money.

Sometimes consumer fraud and deception are systematic within a business organization–known to insiders but difficult or impossible for the consumer to find out on their own. Unscrupulous businesses may train employees to fudge numbers, change a billing code, charge the client for a service not provided, use a deceptive sales pitch, or otherwise cheat, in ways that unfairly cost the consumer money. Some businesses may incentivize such misconduct through their compensation structure, and look the other way as employees deceive consumers by not performing work the consumer paid for them to perform.

These are only a few examples, but they point up an important truth: insiders–people with detailed knowledge of a deceptive or fraudulent business practice–have been given a potent tool to bring an end to that practice. In short, if you’ve had enough of your employer cheating the individuals and families it deals with, the restoration of the MCPA means that firms like Westbrook Law PLLC can represent the defrauded consumers–in individual cases or class actions–and bring lawsuits to punish the bad business. Those lawsuits sometimes bankrupt the business; in other instances, the business may survive but end the practice.

Enforcement of the MCPA, if done thoroughly, will result in better, more honest and transparent businesses that serve their customers better, statewide, over the long run. Can you imagine a day-to-day life in which you didn’t routinely feel like a business was trying to scam you? That is our vision at Westbrook Law, one case at a time.

If you have detailed knowledge of a deceptive, unfair, or fraudulent business practice that involves consumer transactions, we would love to hear from you. Contact Us

Michigan’s Consumer Protection Act Is Back

After more than 25 years, the Michigan Supreme Court has restored the state’s most important consumer protection statute

On Friday, July 31, 2026, the Michigan Supreme Court did something consumers and the lawyers who represent them have been waiting on for the better part of my career. In Attorney General v Eli Lilly and Company, the Court overruled two decisions — Smith v Globe Life Insurance Co (1999) and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc (2007) — that had quietly reduced the Michigan Consumer Protection Act to something close to a dead letter.

What the MCPA was supposed to do

The Legislature passed the Consumer Protection Act in 1976, and it was aggressive by design. It bans “[u]nfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce,” then lists specific prohibited practices — false claims about why a price was reduced, charging a price “grossly in excess” of what similar goods sell for, and many more.

Two features gave the Act teeth. It can be enforced both by the Attorney General and by ordinary consumers filing their own suits. And it shifts fees: a consumer who proves a violation recovers actual damages or $250, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney fees. MCL 445.911(2).

That last part matters more than it sounds. A $900 loss is a real injury to the person who suffered it, but nobody can afford to pay a lawyer by the hour to chase it. Fee shifting is how the Legislature made sure the size of the harm doesn’t decide whether a person can find counsel.

How the statute was hollowed out

The Act exempts “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer.” MCL 445.904(1)(a). (Emphasis added.) Read naturally, that is narrow: if a regulator blessed the very conduct you’re complaining about, you can’t call it deceptive.

Smith read it differently. The question, the Court said in 1999, is not whether the specific misconduct was authorized, but whether the general transaction was — regardless of whether the misconduct itself is prohibited. Liss extended that reasoning in 2007 to licensed residential home builders.

The consequence was predictable, and Justice Michael F. Cavanagh predicted it in dissent: most businesses selling to consumers hold some license or operate under some regulatory scheme. If a general license is enough, most of them are immune.

That is exactly what followed. Courts applying Smith and Liss held the MCPA inapplicable to home builders, car dealers, car makers, mortgage lenders and servicers, real estate agents, plumbers, doctors, grocery stores, casinos, and pesticide applicators. The mere existence of a license became enough to immunize a defendant, with no inquiry into whether the misconduct had anything to do with what the regulator actually authorized. The perverse result: the more heavily regulated the industry, the more complete its protection.

What the Court held

The case grew out of the Attorney General’s investigation into Eli Lilly’s insulin pricing. Anticipating that Lilly would raise the exemption, the AG asked the courts to declare up front that Smith and Liss did not bar the investigation. The circuit court and the Court of Appeals both said the MCPA didn’t apply, because selling pharmaceuticals is a regulated activity.

The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a four-justice majority, Justice Noah Hood pointed out that the word “general” appears nowhere in the statute — Smith and Liss had inserted it while writing “specifically authorized” out. The correct question is whether the specific conduct at issue was authorized by law, not whether the industry is regulated.

The Court found no sufficient reason to preserve the two decisions. They had made much of the MCPA “completely unworkable,” and a business’s interest in relying on them to deceive consumers, the Court said, “is not a valid reliance interest.”

Three justices dissented, but on standing grounds only; they expressly took no position on whether Smith and Lisswere rightly decided.

One caution: the Court did not hold that Eli Lilly violated the MCPA. It held that the exemption no longer closes the door before anyone gets to ask.

Why this matters

I have spent almost twenty years litigating consumer protection cases in Michigan, and in most instances, the MCPA has been a statute I had to explain to clients rather than use. A business would deceive someone, we would look at the Act, then look at Smith and Liss, and go find another theory — often there was no fee shifting to go along with the workable theories, which meant no case at all.

That changes now. Michigan consumers again have a statute that reaches deceptive conduct by regulated businesses, and Michigan lawyers again have the fee-shifting provision that makes those cases possible to bring. Not every claim will win; the exemption still exists and still applies where a regulator genuinely authorized the conduct at issue. But the threshold question is no longer “is this defendant licensed?” It is “was this conduct specifically authorized?” For most deceptive practices, the answer is no.

I am glad to have this tool back.

If you believe a business has treated you unfairly or deceptively, Westbrook Law would like to hear from you. Claims that were foreclosed for the last quarter century may now be viable. Get in touch through our contact page: https://westbrook.law/contact/

Federal Court Grants Preliminary Approval of $9MM Settlement in Debt Collection Abuse Class Action

On November 3, 2025, the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan preliminarily approved a class-action settlement valued at approximately $9 million in debt reductions, credits, and payments to over 5,200 Michigan consumers who were overcharged interest on judgments entered against them. Final approval of the settlement is set to be heard by the court on March 9, 2026.

Westbrook Law PLLC brought the case, VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., against two of the largest debt buyers in the nation, LVNV Funding and Midland Funding, and the collection law firm that represented them, in 2017. The complaint alleges that while Michigan law allowed judgment interest ranging from 2-4% during the relevant time period, the defendants calculated judgment interest at an unlawfully high 13% rate and proceeded to collect the excess interest from consumer debtors through garnishments of bank accounts and tax refunds. The lawsuit alleged that this practice violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and Michigan state debt collection laws.

The parties have agreed to a settlement that recalculates all class members’ judgment balances based on the lawful interest rate, a reduction of approximately $7 million, and further reduces each class member’s balance by $500, totaling over $2 million. Class members whose judgment balances are eliminated by these reductions are entitled to an additional payment of $150 each. In the settlement, the defendants also agree to pay the attorney fees of class counsel and the costs of administering the settlement.

Class action settlements are subject to court approval for fairness, and the court’s preliminary approval is the first in a two-step approval process. The court’s November 3, 2025 order reflects its conclusion, based on the parties’ submissions, that the proposed settlement is fair to the class members and that class counsel and the named plaintiffs have acted in the best interests of the class.

After more than eight years of hard-fought litigation, the class settlement in VanderKodde comes as a welcome victory for Michigan consumers.

TJW

Federal Court Rejects PNC Bank’s Bid to Dismiss Consumer Class Action – Case Update

In February of 2020, Westbrook Law PLLC filed a class action complaint against PNC Bank, captioned Polonowski v. PNC Bank, N.A. The complaint alleges that, contrary to specific requirements of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), PNC Bank routinely fails to send consumers periodic loan statements if they are going through a bankruptcy, even if the consumers have reaffirmed their mortgage debts to PNC. The complaint alleges that this practice harms consumers by preventing them from receiving notice of interest rate changes, minimum payment amounts, remaining balance, and other critical information.

In May of 2020, PNC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that PNC could not be liable for violating TILA because PNC would have “violated federal law” if it had provided periodic loan statements. PNC argued that the automatic stay provided in the bankruptcy code prohibited the sending of any loan statements, even after the plaintiffs’ loan had been reaffirmed and the plaintiffs’ remaining debts had been discharged. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Westbrook Law opposed the motion to dismiss.

The presiding district judge, Hon. Paul L. Maloney, referred PNC’s motion to the magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge sided with PNC and recommended the court grant the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs objected and requested that Judge Maloney conduct a fresh review of the motion.

Today, Judge Maloney issued the court’s opinion, rejecting the report and recommendation and denying PNC’s motion dismiss. The court emphasized that once a discharge order has entered in a bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy code does not prohibit the sending of statements regarding a reaffirmed debt. The court further found that the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) could not be narrowed by its implementing regulations (“Regulation X”), and thus the plaintiffs’ secondary claim that PNC unlawfully failed to correct servicing errors brought to its attention was viable and could not be dismissed.

As a result of today’s decision, the case against PNC will move forward. Westbrook Law hopes to hold PNC accountable for habitual violations of TILA, obtain compensation for a class of consumers affected by these practices, and ultimately force PNC and other lenders to provide critical financial information to consumers.

TJW

Estate Planning and Administration

We are up to date on the changing legal landscape surrounding wills and trusts and can assist our clients to establish, amend, or administer their estate plans. Our emphasis is on crafting plain-language, easily understood estate and trust documents that work within the law to ensure our clients’ individual wishes are carried out.  We can also create health care and financial powers of attorney that are compliant and effective, providing peace of mind in case of disability. 

The reality is a trust can be a fantastic tool for the average person because it simplifies things in the event of your death. So a trust allows you the -grantor- to specify exactly how your estate will be distributed to your beneficiaries when you die, and in the process can avoid probate and heartache.

A family trust is a trust established specifically for the benefit of members of a particular family. The purpose of creating a family trust is to protect and manage family assets for current and/or future generations.

We are here to guide you through whichever process is needed and understand there can be many emotions involved. As we work together you will have peace of mind that everything will be exactly how you deem it.

New Class Action Lawsuit Against Mortgage Servicer Real Time Resolutions Claims Threats to Harm Credit Ratings Broke the Law

Mortgage loan servicers typically collect and process payments for mortgage loans on behalf of the owners of those loans. If your loan statements come from Ocwen, Nationstar (now using the quizzical alias “Mr. Cooper”), or Seterus, just to name a few, you are dealing with a servicer. Real Time Resolutions, Inc., another servicer, is the latest target of a consumer class-action lawsuit filed by Westbrook Law PLLC in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Bushouse v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc.

The new lawsuit alleges that Real Time violated federal and state law through its routine practice of threatening consumers with reporting obsolete, negative credit information about them. Whereas the law does not allow credit reporting of most negative items that are past seven years old, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a), the complaint alleges that Real Time continues to threaten negative reporting well beyond the seven-year mark. This practice, which could frighten consumers into paying obsolete debts they no longer have any legal obligation to pay, is alleged to violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; the Michigan Occupational Code, M.C.L § 339.915; and the Michigan Mortgage Brokers, Lenders, and Servicers Licensing Act, M.C.L. § 445.1672. The plaintiff seeks damages for herself and other Michigan citizens who received the threatening communications.

Our expertise in credit reporting law–i.e., the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act–and consumer collection law informed this lawsuit and many others on behalf of Michigan consumers. If you have concerns about whether a practice by a debt collector or mortgage servicer is fair or lawful, contact us for a consultation.

TJW

Westbrook Law PLLC Notches Win in Wrongful Repossession Trial/Westbrook Law of Grand Rapids, Michigan

After a trial in December of 2017, the Montcalm County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the defendant and counter-plaintiff, represented by Westbrook Law PLLC, in a case that began as a $5,000.00 deficiency claim by the plaintiff/counter-defendant car dealer, and ended with a judgment against the car dealer for more than $10,000.00.

The case, Powers v. Brown, resulted from the dealer’s claim that the buyer missed an installment payment on his auto loan, thus entitling the dealer to repossess the vehicle and collect a deficiency balance on the loan. However, the evidence introduced at trial showed that the dealer had no contractual right to repossess the vehicle. Relying on Michigan’s conversion statute, M.C.L. § 600.2919a, Westbrook Law PLLC argued on behalf of the buyer that the dealer was liable for damages. The court (J. Schafer) agreed, finding that the dealer was liable for double damages and attorney fees.

TJW

House Financial Services Committee Evaluates Bill to Exempt Collection Lawyers from Fair Debt Collection Practices Act/Westbrook Law of Grand Rapids, Michigan

In December, House Bill H.R. 4550, entitled “Practice of Law Technical Clarification Act of 2017,” was introduced by sponsors Vincente Gonzalez (D-Tex.) and Alexander Mooney (R-W. Va.). If passed, the bill would dramatically limit the legal protections to consumers currently provided by the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (“FDCPA”), by completely exempting collection lawyers from liability. Under current law, collection lawyers are treated the same as other debt collectors, and prohibited from engaging in abusive, misleading, or unfair collection practices. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010). Westbrook Law PLLC has filed several lawsuits against collection law firms that violated the FDCPA. Those claims would not exist under the law as amended by H.R. 4550, and there is little question that the amendment would enable new and intensified abuses by collection law firms to go unchecked.

H.R. 4550 is currently being evaluated by the House Financial Services Committee, which may approve or kill the bill. Westbrook Law PLLC is actively engaging with committee members to ensure they are aware of the anti-consumer nature of this bill and to request that they do their part to prevent it from becoming law.

TJW

Supreme Court Releases Consumer-Unfriendly Opinion in Santander – What Does It Mean?/Westbrook Law of Grand Rapids, Michigan

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court released an opinion highly anticipated by consumer lawyers as well as the debt collection industry, in the case of Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. This case dealt with the question of whether a purchaser of defaulted debts, which then attempts to collect those debts from consumers, counts as a “debt collector” that is subject to strict consumer protections provided in the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”).

To grasp the potential impact of this case, one needs to understand the structure of the consumer debt collection industry as it exists today:

The first step is origination, when the consumer first incurs a debt to a creditor such as a bank, credit card issuer, other lender, wireless provider, or cable company.

When the consumer defaults on a debt–usually by failing to pay–one of two things may happen: (1) the original creditor may hire a third-party debt collection company to attempt to collect the debt, generally through telephone calls and collection letters; or (2) the original creditor may attempt to collect the debt itself for some period of time.

Often, once the debt becomes sufficiently aged, the creditor sells, or assigns, the debt to a debt buyer. The debt buyer pays the creditor only a fraction of the face value of the debt, then attempts to recover as much of the debt as possible from the consumer by various means, often including telephone calls and collection letters.

The final stage in the process is a lawsuit filed by collection attorneys acting on behalf of the debt buyer. Most of these lawsuits are not contested, and result in default judgments that are slowly collected through wage, bank account, and tax refund garnishments.

It has long been settled law that, under the FDCPA, third-party debt collection companies and collection attorneys ARE “debt collectors.” Most federal courts found that debt buyers were “debt collectors” as well, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which establishes precedent for federal courts in Michigan. Generally, circuit precedent found that creditors collecting their own debts could NOT be “debt collectors” unless a rare exception applied.

All of this matters for one basic reason: the FDCPA restricts what “debt collectors” are allowed to do, and creates powerful remedies for consumers when they do not comply with the FDCPA. The FDCPA creates various protections for consumers; for example, it requires debt collectors to identify themselves as debt collectors in communications to consumers, disallows certain conduct in collection lawsuits, outlaws attempts to collect debts no longer owed, limits consumer harassment by telephone, and disallows unfair and fraudulent conduct in connection with debt collection. Consumers harmed by violations of the FDCPA are entitled to sue, and can recover a statutory penalty as well as their attorney fees.

In yesterday’s Santander decision, the Supreme Court unanimously held that debt buyers are not automatically “debt collectors” subject to the FDCPA. According to the opinion, penned by newest Justice Neil Gorsuch, this is so because debt buyers are attempting to collect a debt that is owed to them, and thus are creditors, even though they are not the original creditors.

Taken in isolation, the Santander holding might seem catastrophic for consumers besieged by collection attempts from debt buyers (including such large players as Midland Funding, LVNV Funding, Portfolio Recovery Associates, and others), because the protections of the FDCPA would be unavailable. This would enable debt buyers to use, with impunity, the same harassing and unfair collection methods that “debt collectors” are not allowed to use under the FDCPA.  It is true that the Santander decision is beneficial to some debt buyers at the expense of consumers; however, its impact is limited. Justice Gorsuch carefully points out in the opinion that the court’s decision does NOT mean that debt buyers are NEVER “debt collectors.” Indeed, the text of the FDCPA appears clear that debt buyers ARE “debt collectors” if their “principal purpose … is the collection of any debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). With respect to the largest buyers of defaulted credit card debt–i.e., Midland Funding, LVNV, and PRA–an experienced consumer lawyer should easily be able to prove that their “principal purpose” is debt collection; and they are therefore “debt collectors” subject to FDCPA restrictions.

While the Santander decision does not make the consumer advocate’s job easier, and is likely to spur pernicious innovations in the debt buying and debt collection industry, it is hardly the death knell for the FDCPA. Consumer advocates and watchdogs, including us at Westbrook Law PLLC, will continue to find ways to keep abuses in check.

TJW

Collectors Still Pursuing Debt after Bankruptcy Discharge? It’s Illegal./Westbrook Law of Grand Rapids, Michigan

Each year, hundreds of thousands of individuals with overwhelming debts file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy in order to regain their financial freedom.  The usual goal of bankruptcy is to have one’s debts “discharged,” or declared legally unenforceable and effectively nullified.  This is intended to allow the debtor a “fresh start” to their financial affairs.

But a discharge of debts in bankruptcy does not always stop debt collectors, who may continue to contact the debtor by phone or letter, or even file legal proceedings, after a debt has been discharged.  These post-discharge collection attempts rob the debtor of the “fresh start” he or she fought for in bankruptcy, and are often unlawful, violating various state and federal laws designed to protect consumers from abusive debt collection tactics.

If you are still being chased by debt collectors to pay a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy, Westbrook Law PLLC may be able to make the collection efforts stop, punish the debt collectors for violating the law, and get monetary compensation for you.  Contact us for more information or a free consultation.

If you have not filed for bankruptcy but wonder if it may be right for you, contact us for a referral to a qualified bankruptcy law firm.

TJW